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Abstract
Caches have become the prime method for unintended infor-
mation extraction across logical isolation boundaries. Even
Spectre and Meltdown rely on the cache side channel, as it
provides great resolution and is widely available on all ma-
jor CPU platforms. As a consequence, several methods to
stop cache attacks by detecting them have been proposed.
Detection is strongly aided by the fact that observing cache
activity of co-resident processes is not possible without alter-
ing the cache state and thereby forcing evictions on the ob-
served processes. In this work we show that this widely held
assumption is incorrect. Through clever usage of the cache
replacement policy it is possible to track a victims process
cache accesses without forcing evictions on the victim’s data.
Hence, online detection mechanisms that rely on these evic-
tions can be circumvented as they do not detect be the in-
troduced RELOAD+REFRESH attack. The attack requires
a profound understanding of the cache replacement policy.
We present a methodology to recover the replacement pol-
icy and apply it to the last five generations of Intel proces-
sors. We further show empirically that the performance of
RELOAD+REFRESH on cryptographic implementations is
comparable to that of other widely used cache attacks, while
its detectability becomes extremely difficult, due to the neg-
ligible effect on the victims cache access pattern.
1 Introduction
The microarchitecture of modern CPUs shares resources
among concurrent processes. This sharing may result in un-
intended information flows between concurrent processes.
Microarchitectural attacks, which exploit these information
flows, have received a lot of attention in academia, industry
and, with Spectre and Meltdown [32, 37], even in the public
news. The OS or the hypervisor in virtual environments pro-
vide strict logical isolation among processes to enable secure
multithreading. Yet, a malicious process can intentionally
create contention to gain information about co-resident pro-
cesses. Exploitable hardware resources include the branch
prediction unit [2–4], the DRAM [31, 47, 51] and the cache
[6, 13, 20, 44, 45, 57]. Last level caches (LLC) provide very
high temporal and spatial resolution to observe and track
memory access patterns. As a consequence, any code that
generates cache utilization patterns dependent on secret data
is vulnerable. Cache attacks can trespass VM boundaries to
infer secret keys from neighboring processes or VMs [21,49],
break security protocols [26,50] or compromise the end users
privacy [44], but they can leak information from within a vic-
tim memory address space [32] when combined with other
techniques.
Different techniques have been proposed for detection
and/or mitigation of cache and other microarchitectural at-
tacks due to the great threat they pose. On the one hand,
hardware countermeasures take years to integrate and deploy,
may induce performance penalties and currently, are not im-
plemented. On the other hand, other proposals that are meant
for cloud hypervisors [30, 35, 53] and only require making
small modifications to the kernel configuration are neither
implemented presumably due to the overhead they entail.
The only solution that seems practical for users that want
to protect themselves against these kind of attacks, is to de-
tect ongoing attacks and then react in some way. To this end,
different proposals [9, 11, 34, 46, 60] use hardware perfor-
mance counters (HPCs), which are special registers available
in all modern CPUs, that monitor hardware events such as
cache misses. The most recent proposals are able to detect
even attacks specially designed to bypass previous counter-
measures [18]. The common assumption in these works is
that the attacker induces measurable effects on the victim.
We, on the contrary, demonstrate that it is possible to obtain
information from the victim while keeping its data in the
cache and, consequently, not significantly altering its behav-
ior, thus making attack detection difficult.
Our Contribution: We analyze the replacement policy of
current Intel CPUs and identify a new strategy which allows
an attacker to monitor cache set accesses without forcing
evictions of the victim’s data, thereby creating a new and
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stealthy cache-based microarchitectural attack. To achieve
this goal, we perform the first full reverse engineering of dif-
ferent replacement policies present in various generations of
Intel Core processors. We propose a technique that can be
extended to study replacement policies of other processors.
Using this technique, we demonstrate that it is possible to ac-
curately predict which element of the set will be replaced in
case of a cache miss. Then, we show that it is possible to ex-
ploit these deterministic cache replacement policies to derive
a sophisticated cache attack: RELOAD+REFRESH, which
is able to monitor the memory accesses of the desired vic-
tim without generating cache misses. As a proof of concept,
we demonstrate the feasibility and quantify the performance
of RELOAD+REFRESH by retrieving the key of a T-Table
implementation of AES and attacking the square and multi-
ply version of RSA. We prove that our approach is at least as
accurate as other state-of-the-art cache attacks. Even when
adding extra steps to recover the information, the attack has
still enough resolution (similar to PRIME+PROBE) to trace
the victim memory accesses with high accuracy. Thus, our
work reveals the need for new detection mechanisms or coun-
termeasures. To sum up, this work:
• introduces a methodology to test different replacement
policies in modern caches.
• uncovers the replacement policy currently implemented
in modern Intel Core processor generations, from fourth
to eight generation.
• expands the understanding of modern caches and lays
the basis for improving traditional cache attacks.
• presents RELOAD+REFRESH, a new attack that ex-
ploits Intel cache replacement policies to extract infor-
mation referring to a victim memory accesses.
• shows that the proposed attack causes negligible cache
misses on the victim, which renders it undetectable by
state of the art countermeasures.
2 Background and related work
2.1 Cache architecture
CPU caches are small banks of fast memory located between
the CPU cores and the RAM. As they are placed on the CPU
die and close to the cores, they have low access latencies and
thus reduce memory access times observed by the processor,
improving the overall performance. Modern processors in-
clude cache memories that are hierarchically organized; low
level caches (L1 and L2) are core private, smaller and closer
to the processor, whereas the last level cache (LLC or L3) is
bigger and shared among all the cores.
Intel processors traditionally have included L3 inclusive
caches: all the data which is present in the private lower
caches has to be in the shared L3 cache. This approachmakes
cache coherence much easier to implement. However, due to
cache attacks, the newest Intel Skylake Servermicro architec-
ture considers using a non-inclusive Last Level Cache [22].
In most modern processors caches are W-way set-
associative. The cache is organized into multiple sets (S),
each of them containingW lines of usually 64 bytes of data.
The set in which each line is placed is derived from its ad-
dress. The address bits are divided into offset (lowest-order
bits used to locate data within a line), index (log2(S) consecu-
tive bits starting from the offset bits that address the set) and
tag (remaining bits which identify if the data is cached).
2.2 Cache replacement policies
When the processor requests some data, it first tries to re-
trieve this data from the cache (it starts looking in the low-
est levels up to the last level). In the event of a cache hit the
data is loaded from the cache. On the contrary, in the event
of a cache miss, the data is retrieved from the main memory
and it is also placed in the cache assuming that it will be re-
used in the near future. If there is no free room in the cache
set, the memory controller has to decide which element in
the cache has to be evicted. Since the processor is stalled for
several cycles whenever there is a cache miss, the decision of
which data is evicted and which data stays is crucial for the
performance.
Many replacement policies are possible including, for ex-
ample, FIFO (first in first out), LRU (least recently used) or
its approximations such as NRU [52] (not recently used),
LFU (least frequently used), CLOCK [27](keeps a circular
list of the elements) or even pseudo-random replacement
policies. Modern high performance processors implement ap-
proximations to LRU, because LRU is hard to implement (it
requires complex hardware to track each access).
LRU or pseudo LRU policies have demonstrated to per-
form well in most situations. Nevertheless, LRU policy be-
haves poorly for memory-intensive workloads whose work-
ing set is bigger than the available cache size or for scans
(bursts of one-time access requests). As a result, adaptive al-
gorithms, which are capable to adapt themselves to changes
in the workloads, came up. In 2003, Megiddo el al. [42] pro-
posed ARC (Adaptive Replacement Cache) a hybrid of LRU
and LFU. One year later, Bansal et al. [8] presented their so-
lution based on LFU and CLOCK, which they named CAR
(Clock with Adaptive Replacement).
In 2007 Quereshi et al. [48] suggested that performance
could be improved by changing the insertion policy while
maintaining the eviction policy. LIP (LRU Insertion Policy)
consists in inserting each new piece of data in the LRU po-
sition whereas BIP (Bimodal Insertion Policy) most of the
times places the new data in the MRU position and some-
times inserts it in the LRU position. In order to decide which
of the two policies behaves better, they proposed a dynamic
2
insertion policy (DIP). DIP chooses between LIP and BIP
depending on which one incurs fewer misses.
In 2010, Jaleel et al. [29] proposed a cache replacement
algorithm that makes use of Re-reference Interval Prediction
(RRIP). By using 2 bits per cache line, RRIP predicts if a
cache line is going to be re-referenced in the near future.
In case of eviction, the line with the longest interval predic-
tion will be selected. Analogously to Quereshi et al, they pre-
sented two different approaches: Static RRIP (SRRIP) which
inserts each new blockwith an intermediate re-reference, and
Bimodal RRIP (BRRIP) which inserts most blocks with a dis-
tant re-reference interval and sometimes with an intermediate
re-reference interval. They also proposed using set dueling
to decide which policy fits better for the running application
(Dynamic RRIP or DRRIP).
Regarding to Intel processors, their replacement policy is
undocumented and consequently unknown. All that is offi-
cially known is the name of the policy: "Quad-Age LRU"
[28]. The first serious attempt to reveal the cache replace-
ment policy of different processors was made by Abel et
al. [1]. In their work, they were able to uncover the replace-
ment policy of an Intel Atom D525 processor and to infer a
pseudo-LRU policy in an Intel Core 2 Duo E6300 processor.
However, they could not determine the eviction policy in the
other machines (Intel Core 2 Duo E6750 and E8400) they
used for the experiments. Later on, Henry [56] showed that
Intel processors seem to implement a dynamic insertion or
eviction policy, but he did not provide further details about
the replacement policy.
Gruss et al. [17] studied cache eviction strategies on recent
Intel CPUs in order to replace the clflush instruction and
build a remote Rowhammer attack. As they mention, their
work is not strictly a reverse engineering of the replacement
policy, rather they test access patterns to find the best evic-
tion strategy. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first one that provides a comprehensive description of the re-
placement policies implemented on modern Intel processors.
2.3 Cache attacks
Cache attacks monitor the utilization of the cache (the
sequence of cache hits and misses) to retrieve informa-
tion about a co-resident victim. Whenever the pattern
of memory accesses of a security-critical piece of soft-
ware depends on the actual value of sensible data, such
as a secret key, this sensitive data can be deduced by
an attacker and will no longer be private. Traditionally
cache attacks have been grouped into three categories [14]:
FLUSH+RELOAD, PRIME+PROBE and EVICT+TIME.
From those, the FLUSH+RELOAD and the PRIME+PROBE
attacks (and their variants) out-stand over the rest due to their
higher resolution.
Both attacks target the LLC, selecting one memory loca-
tion that is expected to be accessed by the victim process.
They consist of three stages: initialization (the attacker
prepares the cache somehow), waiting (the attacker waits
while the victim executes) and recovering (the attacker
checks the state of the cache to retrieve information about
the victim).
2.3.1 FLUSH+RELOAD
This attack relies on the existence of shared memory. Thus,
it requires memory deduplication to be enabled. Deduplica-
tion is an optimization technique designed to improve mem-
ory utilization by merging duplicate memory pages. Using
the clflush instruction the attacker removes the target lines
from the cache, then waits for the victim process to execute
(or an equivalent estimated time) and finally measures the
time it takes to reload the previously flushed data. Low reload
times mean the victim has used the data.
It was first introduced in [20], and was later extended to
target the LLC to retrieve cryptographic keys, TLS protocol
session messages or keyboard keystrokes across VMs [19,26,
57]. Further, Zhang et al. [61] showed that it was applicable
in several commercial PaaS clouds.
Relying on the clflush instruction and with the same
requirements as FLUSH+RELOAD, Gruss et al. [18] pro-
posed the FLUSH+FLUSH attack. It was intended to be
stealthy and bypass existing monitoring systems. This vari-
ant recovers the information bymeasuring the execution time
of the clflush instruction instead of the reload time, thus
avoiding direct cache accesses and, as a consequence, detec-
tion. However, recent works have demonstrated that it is de-
tectable [9, 34].
2.3.2 PRIME+PROBE
Contrary to the FLUSH+RELOAD attack, PRIME+PROBE
is agnostic to special OS features in the system. Therefore, it
can be applied in virtually every system. Moreover, it can re-
cover information from dynamically allocated data. To do so,
the attacker first fills or primes the cache set in which the vic-
tim data will be placed (initialization stage). Then, he waits
and finally probes the desired set looking for time variations
that carry information about the victim activity.
This attack was first proposed for the L1 data cache in [45]
and later was expanded to the L1 instruction cache [5]. These
approaches required both victim and attacker to share the
same core, which diminishes practicality. However, it has
been recently shown to be applicable to LLC. Researchers
have bypassed several difficulties to target the LLC, as re-
trieving its complex address mapping [23,41,58], and recov-
ered cryptographic keys or keyboard typed keystrokes [13,
24, 36]. Even further, the PRIME+PROBE attack was used
to retrieve a RSA key in the Amazon EC2 cloud [21].
In case a defense system tries to either restrict access to
the timers [33, 40] or to generate noise that could hide tim-
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ing information, cache attacks are less likely to succeed. The
PRIME+ABORT attack [12] overcomes this difficulty. It
exploits Intel’s implementation of Hardware Transactional
Memory (TSX) to retrieve the information about cache ac-
cesses. It first starts a transaction to prime the targeted set,
waits and finally it may or may not receive and abort depend-
ing on whether the victim has or has not accessed this set.
2.4 Countermeasures
Researchers have tackled the problem of mitigating cache
attacks from different perspectives. Several proposals sug-
gest limiting the access to the shared resources that can be
exploited to infer information about a victim by modifying
the underlying hardware [39,54]. While effective, these hard-
ware countermeasures take years to deploy and it is not likely
that any CPU manufacturer will deploy them.
System-level software approaches, on the other hand, re-
quire modification of the current cloud infrastructure or the
Linux kernel. STEALTHMEM [30] uses private virtual
pages that ensure the data located in them is not evicted from
the cache and avoid mapping any other page with these pri-
vate virtual pages. CATalyst [38] uses Intel Cache Allocation
Technology (CAT), which is a technology that enables sys-
tem administrators to control how cores allocate data into the
LLC, to mitigate cache attacks. CACHEBAR [62] designs a
memory management subsystem that dynamically changes
the amount or lines per cache set that a security domain can
occupy to defeat PRIME+PROBE attacks and changes the
state of the pages to avoid FLUSH+RELOAD. These coun-
termeasures are more plausible than the previous ones, how-
ever no cloud provider or OS is implementing them, probably
because of the performance penalties they incur.
For these reasons, we believe that the only countermea-
sures that an attackermay have to face when trying to retrieve
information from a victim, are detection based countermea-
sures which can be implemented at user level. Cache attacks
exploit the side effects of running a program in certain hard-
ware to gain information from it, and similarly, these coun-
termeasures employ monitoring mechanisms to detect such
attacks. Detection systems can use time measurements [10],
hardware performance counters [9, 11, 34, 60] or place data
in transactional regions [16] defined with the Intel TSX in-
structions. All of them measure the effect of the last level
cache misses on the victim or on both the victim and the at-
tacker. As a consequence, an attack that does not generate
cache misses on the victim side would be undetectable by
these systems.
A different approach to protect sensitive applications is to
specifically design them to be secure against side-channels
(no memory accesses depend on private information). Then,
developers can use specific tools to ensure the binary of such
applications does not leak information, even if it is under at-
tack [55, 59]. There are other tools, such as MASCAT [25],
which use code analysis techniques to detect potential attacks
before running a program, as most anti-viruses do. This kind
of tools is effective before malware distribution or execution.
Their effectiveness is reduced in cloud environments where
the attacker does not need to infect the victim.
3 Retrieval of Intel cache eviction policies
This work focuses on the LLC. Since it is shared across cores,
the attacks targeting the LLC are not limited to the situation
in which the victim and the attacker share the same core. It is
also possible to extract fine-grained information from it and
many researchers are concerned about the attacks targeting
the LLC. Attacks that assume a pseudo LRU eviction policy
such as PRIME+PROBE or EVICT+RELOAD can benefit
from the detailed knowledge of the eviction policy, as can
benefit one attacker wishing to carry out a stealthy attack that
does not cause cache misses on the victim.
In order to be able to study the eviction policy, we have
to ensure we can fill one set of the cache with our own data,
access that data and force a miss when desired to observe
which element of the set is evicted. For this reason, we have
constructed an eviction set (a group of w different addresses
that map to one specific set in w-way set-associative caches)
and what we call a conflicting set (a second eviction set that
maps to exactly the same set and is composed of disjoint
addresses). Previous works have shown how to statically re-
cover the complex addressing function [23,41,58]. However,
we have decided to create both the eviction and conflicting
sets dynamically [13]. This approach is faster and general
for all the processors involved in this work.
Algorithm 1 Obtaining the conflicting set
Input: Eviction_set, Conflicting set candidates
Output: Conflicting_set
function GETCONFLICTINGSET(eviction_set, candi-
dates)
con f licting_set←{};
for all e ∈ candidates do
read_all(eviction_set);
flush_all(eviction_set);
read(e);
read_all(eviction_set);
measure time to read e;
if time> threshold then
con f licting_set← e;
if sizeo f (con f licting_set) == w then
break;
return con f licting_set
The eviction set was constructed following the procedure
proposed by Liu et al. in [13] (Algorithm 1). The procedure
for obtaining the conflicting set follows the same principles
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and uses the eviction set that has just been constructed. This
procedure is summarized in algorithm 1. First, we remove all
the data from one set by accessing the eviction set and then,
once the data is in the cache set, flushing the whole eviction
set. When the set is completely empty, we select one address
among all the possible candidates (memory lines whose set
index bits are equal to the eviction set index bits) for the
conflicting set. Finally, we access the candidate address, the
whole eviction set, and re-access the candidate again. If the
reload time is higher than a threshold, we can conclude that
the candidate address maps to the same set as the eviction set.
Thus, it can be included in our conflicting set. We repeat the
same procedure until the conflicting set has w lines.
For all the experiments, we have enabled the use of
hugepages in our systems. Note that the order of the accesses
is important to deduce the eviction policy. We enforce this
order usingmfence instructions, which act as barriers that en-
sure all preceding load and store instructions have finished
before any load or store instruction that follows mfence.
3.1 Design of the experiments
We have performed experiments in five different machines,
each of them including an Intel processor from a different
generation. Table 1 presents a summary of the machines em-
ployed in this work. It includes the processor name, its num-
ber of cores, the associativity of the cache and the OS running
on each machine. We have started by studying the processor
of the fourth generation, which has been a common victim of
published PRIME+PROBE attacks. We have finally covered
from fourth to eighth generations.
Before conducting the experiments to disclose the evic-
tion policy implemented in each of the used machines, we
have performed some experiments intended to verify that no
cached data is evicted in the event of a cache miss if there is
free room in the set. The procedure is quite straightforward:
for each of the sets, we first completely fill it with the data on
its corresponding eviction set. Next, we randomly flush one
of these lines to ensure there is free room in the set, and we
access one of the lines in the conflicting set to ensure there
is going to be a cache miss. Finally, we check, by measuring
times when re-accessing them, that all the lines in the evic-
tion set (except for the one evicted) still reside in the cache.
As expected, in all cases the incoming data was loaded in
replacement of the flushed line.
Note that in a machine fully controlled by us, we can com-
pare the actual evolution of the data in each of the sets with its
theoretical evolution defined by an eviction policy during the
runtime. This is the main idea of the procedurewe propose to
retrieve the replacement policy. Algorithm 2 summarizes this
procedure. Each of the policies that has been tested had to be
manually defined. We have evaluated true LRU, Tree PLRU,
CLOCK, NRU, Static and Bimodal RRIP, self-defined poli-
cies using four control bits, etc. among many other possible
cache eviction policies. After multiple experiments, we can
conclude that the implemented policy is the defined policy
which best matches the experimental observations.
Algorithm 2 tries to emulate by software the behavior of
the hardware (of the cache). For this purpose, it uses two ar-
rays of size w. On the one hand, address_array mimics the
studied set, storing the memory addresses whose data is in
the cache set. On the other hand, control_array contains the
control bits used for deciding which address will be evicted
in case of conflict. Additionally, we need to manually define
one function that updates the content of the address_array,
one function that updates the control_array and another one
that provides the eviction candidate i.e. it returns the address
of the element that will be evicted in case of conflict. These
functions are defined based on the replacement policy.
As an example, we assume we want to test the NRU policy
[52], which turns out to match the policy implemented in an
Intel Xeon E5620 according to our experiments. According
to its specification, NRU uses one bit per cache line, this bit
is set whenever a cache line is accessed. If setting one bit im-
plies that all the bits of a cache set will be equal to one, then
all the bits (except for the one that has just being accessed)
will be cleared. In case of conflict, NRUwill remove from the
cache one element whose control bit is equal to zero. Thus
in our procedure, the control bits would be -1 (line empty),
0 (line not recently used), and 1 (line recently used). When
a memory line is accessed, the update function first checks
if its address is already included in the address_array. If it
is not, our function will add it to the address_array and set
the corresponding bit in the control_array. On the contrary,
the function only updates the control_array. The getEviction-
Candidate function will return one array position whose con-
trol bit value is -1, or, if no control bit is equal to -1, one
whose control bit is equal to 0. In case multiple addresses
have control bits equal to -1 or to 0, the function will return
the first address whose control bits are -1 or 0, that it encoun-
ters when traversing the control_array from the beginning.
Finally, after forcing a cache miss, the testDataEvicted() re-
turns the element truly evicted that we then compare with the
predicted by the NRU policy (the output of getEvictionCan-
didate).
We have noticed that only accesses to the LLC update the
values of the control bits of the accessed element. That is, if
the data is located in L1 or L2 caches when requested (reload
time lower than ll_threshold), we do not update the values in
the control_array. Figure 1 shows the distinction between
accesses to low and last level caches based on reload times.
3.2 Results
The outcomes of our experiments highlight some differences
in the cache architecture of the machines, as also noticed
in [12]. Traditionally, the cache is divided into slices, each
of them containing N sets. The number of slices used to be
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Table 1: Details of the machines used in this work to retrieve their Replacement Policies
Processor i7-4790 i3-5010U i7-6700K i5-7600K i7-8650U
Cores 4 2 4 4 4
Associativity 16 12 16 12 16
OS Centos 7.0 Ubuntu 14 Ubuntu 16 Centos 7.0 Debian 9.5
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Figure 1: Distribution of the access times to different data.
These times depend on which memory it was located.
equal to the number of physical cores a machine has. This is
true for the 4th and 5th generation processors. Per contra, the
newest ones have as many slices as virtual cores; that is, two
times the number of physical cores. Cache sizes are similar,
so they also differ in the number of sets per slice.
Since several policies suggest that different sets can per-
form differently, we have repeated the experiment in Algo-
rithm 2 for each of the sets in the last level cache. As a
result, we have found out that only the i7-4790 and the i3-
5010U machines (4th and 5th generation) implement set du-
eling to dynamically select the eviction policywith better per-
formance between two candidate policies. We conducted sev-
eral further experiments intended for determining which sets
implement a fixed policy and which others change their pol-
icy based on the number of hits and misses. Locating the sets
with a fixed policy is interesting for several reasons: these
sets will allow to accurately determine the two different re-
placement policies and they will allow to favor one policy
over the other depending on our interests. This also means
that we could monitor one set belonging to the group of fol-
lowers to determine which policy is currently operating.
The strategies for locating the sets included different ac-
cess patterns that we believed would lead to different num-
ber of misses. For example, if we access the eviction set in
an ordered way, then we access the whole conflicting set, and
finally re-access again the eviction set, we will observe differ-
ent number of misses depending on the policy. Pseudo LRU
policies will probably evict all the data in the eviction set
after accessing the elements in the conflicting set. Whereas
other policies intended for good performance in these situa-
tions (burst accesses to memory) will probably incur fewer
misses. As a result, we have located two regions composed
Algorithm 2 Test of the desired eviction policy
Input: Eviction_set, Conflicting_set
Output: Accuracy of the policy ⊲ hits/trials
function TESTPOLICY(eviction_set, conflicting_set)
hits= 0;
while i≤ num_experiments do
j = 0,i++;
control_array← {};address_array←{};
initialize_set(); ⊲ Fills address and control arrays
lim= random();
while j ≤ lim do
mfence; j++;
next_data= eviction_set[random()];
measure time to read next_data;
if time≥ ll_threshold then ⊲ LLC access
update(control_array,next_data);
con f_element = con f licting_set[random()];
read(con f_element); ⊲ Force miss
candidate=getEvictionCandidate();
if (testDataEvicted() ==candidate) then
hits++;
return hits/num_experiments;
of 64 cache sets in each slice that control each policy. Figure
3 represents all the sets of a cache slice with the control re-
gions. The region coloured in blue controls the policy 1, and
the region coloured in red controls the policy 2.
However, not all the sets within the aforementioned re-
gions implement a fixed policy. Particularly, only one of the
sets in each slice implements a fixed policy, the correspond-
ing sets in the remaining slices will have a varying policy.
This fact was discovered after multiple experiments with dif-
ferent patterns. The sets with fixed policy for each of the
slices are depicted in figure 4. To obtain the actual control
sets within the slice, it is important to test the sets without
order, as it may seem that some sets have a fixed policy and
they do not.
The policy we will undercover is the one implemented in
the L3 cache. The policies implemented in the L1 and L2
caches can be different. We have been able to uncover a
policy that seems to explain the observed evictions. In fact,
over 98% of the evictions have been correctly predicted in all
cases 1, and it is likely that the errors were due to noise.
1These results refer to the sets with fixed policy in the machines that
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Data (D) request
Return D
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Figure 2: Diagram that represents the process of data (D) retrieval whenever the processor makes a request. The blocks with
green background represent a cache hit, whereas the blocks with red background represent a cache miss.
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Figure 3: Location of the sets controlling the eviction policy
within a slice of 2048 sets. Mode 1 (blue) and mode 2 (red).
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Figure 4: Detailed representation of the sets with fixed policy
within each of the slices for the i7-4790 machine.
Although we have observed differences between genera-
tions and some machines implement set dueling, the decision
of which data is going to be evicted is the same in all cases.
The replacement policy is always the same and what changes
is the insertion policy. Due to space limitations and to avoid
creating confusion, we only include here the description of
the policies revealed by our experiments as the ones imple-
mented in the Intel processors. Assuming that the policy is
named Quad-Age LRU, in the following we refer to ages in-
stead of control bits. Figure 2 represents the two possible
situations whenever the processor requests a piece of data in
our processors. If the data is in the LLC, the controller de-
creases the age of the requested element when giving it to
the processor. If there is a cache miss and one element has to
be evicted, the replacement policy will select the oldest one.
Intel processors use two bits to represent the age of the ele-
ments in the cache. Consequently, the maximum age is three.
In case the reader wonders which block will be replaced in
implement set dueling. The remaining sets were tested once the two policies
were known and we check they followed one of them.
case there are multiple blocks whose age is three, the answer
is the first one it finds. The cache behaves somehow like an ar-
ray of data, and when searching for a block of data placed on
it, the controller always starts from the same location, which
would be the equivalent to the index 0 in an array.
As we have already stated, the machines used in our ex-
periments only differ in the insertion age; that is, the value
that gets a cache line as age when first loaded in the set or
when reloaded after a cache miss. Particularly, the i7-4790
and the i3-5010U machines (4th and 5th generation) that im-
plement set dueling insert the elements with age 2 in one of
the cases and with age 3 in the other. We denote each of these
situations or working modes as mode 1 and mode 2 respec-
tively. The i7-6700K, the i5-7600K and the i7-8650U ma-
chines (6th, 7th and 8th generations) always insert the blocks
with age 2, which is equivalent to the mode 1 in the oldest
machines.
In order to help the reader to understand how the cache
works, figure 5 shows an example of how the contents of
a cache set are updated with each access according to each
policy. When the processor requests the line “d", there is an
empty block in the set, so "d" is located in that set and it gets
age 2 (Mode 1) or age 3 (Mode 2). In mode 1, the eviction
candidate is now “a" because it is the only one with age 3,
whereas in mode 2 the eviction candidate is “d" as it has age
3 and is on the left of “a". The processor then requests “b"
so its age decreases from 2 to 1 in both cases. Accessing
“g" causes a miss. The aforementioned eviction candidates
will be replaced with “g", and its age will be set to 2 or 3
respectively. Eventually, when the processor requests “a", it
will cause a miss in mode 1 (it was evicted on the previous
step) and a hit in mode 2, so it will decrease its age.
4 RELOAD+REFRESH
If any kind of sharingmechanism is implemented, an attacker
knowing the eviction policy can place some data that the vic-
tim is likely to use in the cache (the target) and in the desired
position among the set. Since the position of the blocks and
their ages (which in turn depend on the sequence of mem-
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Figure 5: Sequence of data accesses in a cache set updating their content and their associated ages for the two observed policies.
Mode 1 of the 4th and 5th generations behaves exactly the same as the 6th 7th and 8th generations. The red arrow points the
eviction candidate, that is, the data that would be evicted in case of cache miss.
ory accesses) determine the exact eviction candidate, the at-
tacker can force the target to be the eviction candidate. If the
victim uses the target it will be no longer the eviction candi-
date, because its age decreases with the access. The attacker
can force a miss and check afterwards if the target is still in
the cache. If it is, the attacker has retrieved the desired infor-
mation and the victim has retrieved the data from the cache
without any cache misses (no attack trace). This is the main
idea of the RELOAD+REFRESH attack.
OSs implement mechanisms such as Kernel Same-page
Merging (KSM) in Linux [7] that improve memory utiliza-
tion by merging multiple copies of identical memory pages
into one. This feature was originally designed for virtual en-
vironments where multiple VMs are likely to place the same
data in memory, and was later included in the OSs. Although
most cloud providers have disabled it, it is still enabled in
multiple OSs. When enabled, the attacker needs some reverse
engineering to retrieve the address he wants to monitor and
he also needs to find an eviction set that maps to the same set
as this address. Section 3 shows how to construct the eviction
sets in order to find the one which creates a “conflict” with
the target address. We follow the procedure in algorithm 1 re-
placing the conflicting set candidates with the target address.
We use figure 6 to depict the stages of the attack and the
possible “states” of the cache set. The attacker first inserts
into the cache the target address and then all the elements
in the eviction set except one, which will be used to force
an eviction. By the time the attacker has finished filling the
cache with data, the target address will be in level 3 cache.
The number of ways in low level caches is lower than the
number of ways in the L3 cache, and since the L3 cache is
inclusive it will remove the target address from the low level
caches when loading the last elements of the eviction set.
Even if the victim and the attacker are located in the same
core, an access of the victim to the target address will update
its age, so the attacker would be able to retrieve this informa-
tion.
The data is placed in such a way that the target becomes
the eviction candidate. The attacker then waits for the victim
to access the target. If it does the eviction candidate changes
and is now the element inserted in the second place. If it does
not, the eviction candidate is still the target address. The at-
tacker reads then the remaining element of the eviction set
(evw−1), forcing this way a conflict in the cache set, and the
eviction of the candidate. As a consequence, when reading
(RELOAD) the target address again, the attacker will know
if the victim has used the data (low reload time) or not (high
reload time). The state of the cache has to be reverted to the
initial one, so all the elements get the same age again (RE-
FRESH). The element evw−1 is forced out of the cache, so it
could be used to create a new conflict on the next iteration.
When the cache policy is working in mode 2, each element
is inserted with age 3. In this case, steps 1 to 5 are equivalent.
However step 6 changes depending on whether the victim is
allocated in the same core as the attacker or not. When not,
the other elements have age 3 and the target is the eviction
candidate, so there is no need to refresh the data for the at-
tack. On the other hand, when they are on the same core, the
attacker needs to remove the target from the low level cache
by refreshing the other elements in the cache. Moreover, the
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Figure 6: Sequence of possible cache set states during the
attack for the mode 1 or the newest generations, starting with
all elements in the set with age 2.
attack could be performed using the low level caches.
The mode 2 policy enables a detectable fast cross core
cache attack that does not require shared memory. Once the
cache set is filled with the attacker’s data, the eviction candi-
date is now the first element inserted by the attacker. If the
victim uses the expected data, the eviction candidate will be
replaced. Even if the victim uses the data multiple times, its
age will not change, since it will be fetched from the low level
caches. Then, after forcing a miss, the attacker only has to ac-
cess the first element (eviction candidate) to check whether
the victim has or has not accessed the target data. Note that
with this access the attacker replaces the victim’s data (be-
cause it became the eviction candidate when loaded) so it is
equivalent to the REFRESH. If, on the contrary, the victim
does not use the data, the attacker’s data will still be in the
cache. The attacker will then flush and reload this data to en-
sure it gets age 3 again.
Algorithms 3 and 4 summarize the steps of the
RELOAD+REFRESH attack when the insertion age is two
(newest Intel generations or mode 1 in oldest generations).
The cache set is filled with the target address plus W − 1
elements of the eviction set during initialization. Then, the
attacker waits for the victim to run the code. Later, he per-
forms the RELOAD and REFRESH steps. The RELOAD
step gives information about the victim accesses and the RE-
FRESH step gets the set ready to retrieve information from
the victim. When initializing the set, we first fill the set, then
flush the whole set and finally reload the data again to ensure
the insertion order.
In the RELOAD function it is not necessary to flush the
Target_address unless it has not been used by the victim. The
same assumption is true for the conflicting address or the
element w− 1 of the eviction set, which would have to be
flushed only in that situation. However, to avoid if conditions
in the code,we have chosen to implement the RELOAD func-
tion this way. Low reload times mean the data was used by
the victim, whereas high reload times mean it was not.
Algorithm 3 Reload function
Input: Eviction_set, Target_address
Output: Reload time
function RELOAD(Target_address,eviction_set)
“rdtsc";
“mfence";
read(eviction_set[w− 1]); ⊲ Forces a miss
“mfence";
f lush(eviction_set[w− 1]);
“mfence";
read(Target_address);
f lush(Target_address);
“mfence";
read(Target_address); ⊲ Reload on first position
“mfence";
“rdtsc";
read(eviction_set[0]);
return time_reload;
The REFRESH function presented is meant for a 12 way
set. Since the target and the first element of the eviction set
have been loaded in the RELOAD step, the REFRESH func-
tion only has to access the remaining 10 elements of the set.
To avoid out of order execution and ensure the order, the ele-
ments of the eviction set have to be provided as a linked list
(one element contains the address of the following one). Ad-
ditionally the refresh time can be used to detect if any other
process is also using that set.
4.1 Noise tolerance
The proposed attack relies on the order in which the elements
are inserted into the cache set to both avoid misses on the vic-
tim side and to learn information about the data that has been
accessed. If other processes are running and using data that
maps to the same cache slice (introducing noise), the effi-
ciency of the attack can be lessened and also some detection
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Algorithm 4 Refresh function
Input: Eviction_set
Output: Refresh time
function REFRESH(Eviction_set)
volatile unsigned int time;
asm __volatile__(
“ mfence \n"
“ rdtsc \n"
“ movl %%eax, %%esi \n"
“ movq 8(%1), %%rdi \n" ⊲ Eviction_set[1]
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n"
“ movq (%%rdi), %%rdi \n" ⊲ Eviction_set[w-2]
“ mfence \n"
“ rdtsc \n"
“ subl %%esi, %%eax \n" ⊲ Time value on %eax
);
return time_re f resh;
mechanisms can be triggered.
As mentioned before, the refresh step can reveal such
situations. Then, the attacker can slightly change the ap-
proach. Assuming that only one address is being used by the
noise generating process, the attacker can easily handle noise,
avoid detection and still gain information about the victim.
The trick to deal with noise is placing the target on a differ-
ent place within the set (the second place in this example). In
case somebody else uses any data mapping to that set, the re-
placed data belongs to the attacker; specifically it is the data
placed in first place in the set. When the attacker forces a
miss, the eviction candidate will be either the target address
(if the victim did not used it) or the element inserted in third
place (the victim did use the target data). The attacker can
gain information about the victim by reloading the target ad-
dress and he must begin by refreshing the third element of
the eviction set and finish with the first one which will evict
the “noise" from the cache, so the age of all the blocks is 2
again.
5 Results
To show the applicability of RELOAD+REFRESH, we have
replicated two published attacks: one against the T-Table im-
plementation of AES and one against the square andmultiply
exponentiation implementation included in RSA. Although
both implementations have been replaced by new ones, we
use them for comparison. All the experiments presented in
this section have been performed in the intel i5-7600K ma-
chine.
5.1 Attacking AES
The T-Table implementation used to be a popular software
implementation of AES. While still available, this implemen-
tation is not the default option when compiling the Openssl
library due to its susceptibility to micro architectural at-
tacks. This implementation replaces the SubBytes, ShiftRows
andMixColumns operations with table lookups (memory ac-
cesses) and XOR operations. Since the accesses to the T-
Tables depend on the secret key, an attacker monitoring just
one line of each T-Table is able to recover the full AES key.
Our scenario is similar to the one described by Irazoqui et
al. in [6]. They focused in retrieving information about the
last round of the AES encryption process, where the cipher-
text is obtained by performing one XOR operation between
an element contained in the tables and the secret key. As the
content of the tables is publicly available from the source
code, they obtained the secret key xoring it with the cipher-
text.
Besides performing the attack against the AES
T-Table implementation (Openssl 1.0.1f) using the
RELOAD+REFRESH (R+R) technique, we have per-
formed the same attack using the FLUSH+RELOAD (F+R)
and PRIME+PROBE (P+P) techniques, to provide a fair
comparison regarding to the number of traces required to
obtain the key. In order to retrieve the whole key, the attacker
has to monitor at least one line of each T-Table. The attacker
can monitor from one up to four lines at a time. For this
comparison we monitor one table at a time.
Table 2 shows the results for each of the approaches. In
this scenario the attacker performs one operation, then the
victim performs the encryption, and finally the attacker re-
trieves the information about the victim. That is, victim and
attacker do not interfere with each other while doing the dif-
ferent operations. As it can be inferred from the table, our ap-
proach performs almost as good as FLUSH+RELOAD, and
clearly outperforms PRIME+PROBE.
Table 2: Mean number of samples required to retrieve each
four byte group of the whole AES key when monitoring one
line per encryption.
Attack R+R F+R P+P
Samples 110000 108000 220000
5.1.1 Detection evaluation
RELOAD+REFRESH is able to retrieve an AES key with
a negligible impact on the victim process. We compare the
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Figure 8: Distribution of the encryption times in different
situations. Each distribution includes 1 million samples.
number of cache misses the victim suffers per encryption per-
formed, for all the attacks and for normal executions. We use
the PAPI software interface [43] to read the counters referred
to the victim. PAPI allows us to insert one instruction just be-
fore and another one just after the encryption process to read
the L3 cache misses counter, which is mainly the informa-
tion used for cache attack detection [9,11,34,60]. As a result,
figure 7 shows the distribution of the number of misses the
victim sees for each attack and for the normal execution of
the encryption.
As figure 7 shows, our attack can not be distinguished from
the normal performance of the AES encryption process by
measuring the number of misses. Note that, when perform-
ing the PRIME+PROBE attack against AES, around 20% of
the times the attacker does not cause misses on the victim.
When retrieving the information about the victim using this
approach, we first perform a PRIME, then wait for the vic-
tim to perform an encryption and finally perform a PROBE.
During the PRIME stage the elements in the eviction set are
accessed from 0 to 11, whereas in the PROBE step they are
accessed the opposite way, in a zig-zag pattern. Due to the
eviction policy and to the zig-zag pattern some of the ele-
ments still reside in low level caches and their ages are not
updated. As a consequence, the attack is not able to evict the
victim’s data from the cache, so the victim does not see any
miss and it is likely that the attacker sees a false positive.
Additionally, we use the rdtsc instruction to measure the
time it takes to complete each encryption and show the re-
sults in figure 8. The differences observed in figure 8 be-
tween the normal encryption and the RELOAD+REFRESH
approach are not significant if we compare them with the
other attacks. The mean encryption time when there is
no attack is 595 cycles, whereas it increases up to 623
cycles when attacked with the RELOAD+REFRESH tech-
nique. This time difference exists because, when suffering
the RELOAD+REFRESH attack, the victim has to load the
data from the L3 cache instead of loading it from the L1 or
L2 caches.
5.2 Attacking RSA
RSA is the most widely used public key crypto system used
for data encryption as well as for digital signatures. Its secu-
rity is based on the practical difficulty of the factorization of
the product of two large prime numbers. RSA involves a pub-
lic key (used for encryption) and a private key (used for de-
cryption). There are many algorithms suitable for computing
the modular exponentiation required for both encryption and
decryption. In this work we focus in the square and multiply
exponentiation algorithm [15] as Yarom et al. did in [57].
Square and multiply computes x = be modm as a sequence
of Square and Multiply operations (followed by a Modulo
Reduce) that depend on the bits of the exponent e. If the
bit happens to be a 1, then the Square-Multiply-Reduce se-
quence of operations is executed. On the other hand, if the
bit is a 0, only the Square-Reduce operations are executed.
As a consequence, retrieving the sequence of operations exe-
cuted means recovering the exponent; that is, the key.
As a difference with the attack against AES, we monitor
instructions instead of data. Additionally, an attack against
RSA needs to have enough time resolution to correctly re-
trieve the sequence of operations. As we did with AES, we
performed the attack using our stealthy technique as well as
the FLUSH+RELOAD and PRIME+PROBE techniques.
In this work we use the libgcrypt version 1.5.0, which in-
cludes the aforementioned square and multiply implementa-
tion. The key length in our experiments is 2048 bits. When
attacking RSA it is possible to monitor all the functions im-
plied in the exponentiation or just one. When monitoring
all the instructions the attacker is able to reconstruct the se-
quence of observations, when monitoring only one instruc-
tion the attacker has to use the differences of times between
occurrences of the monitored event to retrieve the key. Since
our purpose is to compare the ability of our approach to ob-
tain information about the victim, we only monitor the mul-
tiply operation. All the attacks were configured to obtain a
sample with the same time resolution (3000 cycles), to en-
sure the differences in accuracy are due to the attack tech-
nique.
Figure 9 shows an example of part of a retrieved trace
using the RELOAD+REFRESH approach. The trace corre-
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sponding to the real sequence of squares and multiplies is
represented as blue bars with different values, 800 means a
square was executed and 700 it was a multiply. Since the
timestamp is collected after each exponentiation operation
has finished, and the timestamp of the attack samples after
the reload operation, it may seem that there is some misalign-
ment between traces.
The results of our experiments are summarized in table 3.
The accuracy is given as the number of multiplies correctly
detected divided by the number of multiplies really executed
during the RSA decryption. The percentage of false positives
is obtained as the total number a multiply was detectedminus
the number of correctly detected operations, divided by the
total number of detected multiplies:
FP=
Muldetected −Mulcorrect
Muldetected
Again, the RELOAD+REFRESH performance is similar
to FLUSH+RELOAD. The increase in the number of false
positives for the PRIME+PROBE approach is most likely
due to the way each sample is obtained. In this case, we
measure the prime time, then wait for around 3000 cycles,
and then measure the probe time, and so on and so forth.
Each prime or probe operation gives the time measurement
required for detecting the accesses. Taking into the account
the eviction policy, it is expected that sometimes the victim
data still resides in the cache after a prime or probe step.
Table 3: Percentage of samples correctly retrieved and false
positives generated by each approach when attacking RSA.
Attack R+R F+R P+P
True positives 94.9% 97.25 % 96.16%
False positives 38.75% 38.86% 57.25%
5.2.1 Detection evaluation
We have monitored the number of cache misses detected
when executing a RSA decryption. Figure 10 includes
the resulting distributions for 1000 samples without attack
and applying the considered attacks. The number of total
misses increases compared to the no-attack case for the
FLUSH+RELOAD attack. However, it decreases for both the
RELOAD+REFRESH and PRIME+PROBE attacks, being
RELOAD+REFRESH the approach causing the minimum
amount of misses. This result is explained due to the mon-
itoring process, to the PRIME+PROBE attack that does not
evict the data from the cache, and to the fact that in the RSA
decryption most misses happen at the beginning of the pro-
cess. These results prove that the total amount of misses per
decryption is not indicative of an attack going on for RSA.
For this reason we have also monitored the victim LLC
misses periodically, with a sampling rate of 100 µs. The re-
sults obtained in this case confirm that the main differences
between RELOAD+REFRESH and the normal operation of
the decryption process occur during the initialization steps.
During this initialization, the number of misses caused by
RELOAD+REFRESH and PRIME+PROBE is lower than in
the normal execution. Later, when the number of misses of
the normal operation tends to zero, the number of misses for
the RELOAD+REFRESH is also close to zero. On the con-
trary, both FLUSH+RELOAD and PRIME+PROBE cause a
noticeable amount of misses. Since detection mechanisms
such as CacheShield [9], define a region in with some misses
are tolerated to avoid false positives, our attack will not trig-
ger an alarm. Figure 11 shows the section of the decryption
process in which the number of misses has become stable.
For each sample we get with the RELOAD+REFRESH ap-
proach, we have to perform both operations and then wait
for 3000 cycles. The RSA decryption process runs in paral-
lel, which means both victim and attacker can try to access
the memory simultaneously. If the victim tries to execute the
multiply operation when the attacker is flushing and reload-
ing the mentioned line, the victim may get a miss. Therefore,
a few misses can be observed in figure 11 for our approach.
6 Discussion of the results
The absence of randomness in the replacement algorithm
makes it possible to accurately determine which of the ele-
ments located in a cache set will be evicted in case of con-
flict. Also, the accurate timers included in Intel processors
altogether with the cflush instruction allow to trace accesses
to the different caches and to force the cache lines to have
the desired ages, we exploit these facts to run undetectable
attacks.
RELOAD+REFRESH is just one way to exploit the evic-
tion policy assuming some kind of memory sharing mech-
anism enabled. In the case that the victim and the attacker
do not share memory, our proposal can be adapted so the at-
tacker can track his own data. The attacker has to prepare
the data in the set, in such a way that once the victim places
his data in the cache, the eviction candidate is one of the el-
ements the attacker controls. The target address will only be
evicted if not used by the victim, who will see a cache miss
the next time that tries to use it. If there is an encryption
process going on, the most likely situation is that the victim
uses the data. As a result, the number of misses will be lim-
ited. This is a new idea, that would lead to different results
and a new attack, that we leave for future work.
The knowledge of the eviction policy, enables the us-
age of a different access pattern to gain the information
about the victim and to ensure its data is really evicted
from the cache, reducing the amount of false positives. Thus,
PRIME+PROBE attacks, EVICT+RELOAD attacks or any
attack requiring to evict some data from the cache can bene-
fit from our results. Moreover, the PROBE step can, in some
cases, be reduced to just one access to the eviction candidate.
12
8.15 8.2 8.25 8.3 8.35 8.4 8.45 8.5 8.55 8.6
·106
700
800
900
Time
C
y
cl
es
Real execution
Retrieved data
Figure 9: Example of a retrieved trace referred to an execution of a RSA decryption. The blue bars represent the real execution
of squares (points equal to 800) and multiplies (700). The yellow line represents the information retrieved, low reload times
mean detection of the multiply execution.
4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000
0
100
200
300
Number of L3 cache misses
A
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
sa
m
p
le
s no attack
R+R
F+R
P+P
Figure 10: Distribution of the number of misses induced in
the victim process by the different attacks, and with no at-
tack.
40 45 50 55 60 65
0
50
100
150
Sample number
L
L
C
m
is
se
s
no attack
R+R
F+R
P+P
Figure 11: Detail of a trace of misses measured each 100 µs
for each of the approaches.
6.1 Performance of Reload+Refresh
As a difference with traditional cache attacks, one of our
main objectives is to be stealthy. This involves we should
cause as few cache misses and as low delay as possible on
the victim process. Consequently, our sampling rate has to
be at least the same as the rate at which the victim using its
own data. We have already showed that it is possible to ex-
tract information referring to a RSA decryption, however in
this section we discuss the performance of our approach and
the resolution penalty paid as the price for stealthiness. Com-
pared with traditional attacks such as PRIME+PROBE or
FLUSH+RELOAD, our proposal is more sophisticated and
involves extra steps in order to retrieve the same information.
RELOAD+REFRESH includes an access to one address
not located in the working set (the conflicting address) plus
some others accesses focused in checking if the data has
been replaced and in re-allocating the data in the desired
places within the cache set. As a consequence, it induces
some misses on the attacker side and the corresponding de-
lays. In our test machine we have measured the time in cy-
cles it takes to perform both the RELOAD (1012) and the
REFRESH (447) operations as well as the mean time result-
ing of performing the two operations sequentially, that is, the
maximum sampling rate (1520). When the number of ways
per set increases, we do not expect variations in the RELOAD
time, however there will be a proportional increase in the RE-
FRESH time as it would be for a PRIME+PROBE attack.
Regarding to the capability of the channel to extract infor-
mation, FLUSH+RELOAD attacks are the fastest and most
accurate. RELOAD+REFRESH attacks do not lose accuracy,
nevertheless, their performance is degraded due to the ex-
tra accesses. The mean times between samples that we have
measured for the FLUSH+RELOAD attack is about 260 cy-
cles, whereas this time is 810 cycles for PRIME+PROBE.
Note that in the PRIME+PROBE approach the time varies
between 280 and 1950, which is a great variation and makes
it harder to accurately obtain samples with resolutions below
1950.
To provide more insights into the resolution required
to obtain data from algorithms such as RSA, we have
gathered time measurements between calls to square and
multiply. This time is approximately 1400 cycles for
keys with 1024 bits and 3100 cycles for keys with 2048
bits. When the key length of RSA is 1024 bits, both
PRIME+PROBE and RELOAD+REFRESH may have trou-
ble getting the proper number of samples. However, we have
been able to accurately retrieve 93% of the multiply execu-
tions gathering the information at maximum speed with the
RELOAD+REFRESH attack.
13
7 Conclusion
This work presented a thorough analysis of cache replace-
ment policies implemented in Intel processors covering from
4th to 8th generations. To this end, we have developed a
methodology that allows us to test the accuracy of each pol-
icy by comparing the data that such policy selects as the evic-
tion candidate with the data truly evicted after forcing a miss.
The RELOAD+REFRESH attack builds on this deep un-
derstanding of the platforms replacement policy to stealthily
exploit cache accesses to extract information about a victim.
We have demonstrated the feasibility of our approach by tar-
geting AES and RSA and retrieving as much information as
we can retrieve with other state of the art cache attacks. Ad-
ditionally, we have have monitored the victim while running
these attacks to confirm that our attack causes a negligible
amount of last level cache misses, rendering it impossible to
detect with current countermeasures.
These results are not only useful for broadening the
understanding of modern CPU caches and their perfor-
mance but also for improving previous attacks and evic-
tion strategies. Our work also demonstrates that new detec-
tion countermeasures have to be designed to protect against
RELOAD+REFRESH.
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